The Interaction of Economic Agents in Cournot Duopoly Models under Ecological Conditions: A Comparison of Organizational Modes

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Abstract

This paper presents a comparative analysis of the efficiency of organizational modes (information structures) for the interaction of economic agents in static and dynamic Cournot duopoly models. We compare the independent behavior of equal players, their cooperation, and the hierarchy formalized as Germeier games. The efficiency of individual players and the entire society is quantitatively assessed using the private and social relative efficiency indices. The ecological safety conditions of the system are investigated. An organizational and economic interpretation of the results is proposed

About the authors

G. A Ugol'nitskiy

Southern Federal University

Email: ougoln@mail.ru
Rostov-on-Don, Russia

A. B Usov

Southern Federal University

Author for correspondence.
Email: abusov@sfedu.ru
Rostov-on-Don, Russia

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